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THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA:
REASSESSMENT OF BORRERO V. ALJETS AND
THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF
INADMISSIBLE ALIENS
I. INTRODUCTION
Every day the reverberating crash of steel doors echoes
throughout prisons across the nation. The echo rings louder for some
than others, because for some the deafening sound serves as a
continual reminder of a state of uncertainty associated with a
possible life sentence. This sentence is neither the product of judge
and jury nor the result of a heinous crime against society. Rather, it
is a life sentence resulting from the government's inability to find
another alternative. This is Lazaro Borrero's reality, and that of
thousands of other imprisoned aliens like him.
Indefinite imprisonment without the possibility of release
conjures images of the most Draconian penalties, believed to be long
abandoned by rational and sophisticated Western societies. The
United States, however, finds itself in the twenty-first century
pursuing an immigration policy that authorizes the indefinite
detention of aliens found within its borders.
In Borrero v. Aljets,' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6),2 which allows continued detention of
inadmissible aliens beyond the standard removal period, authorized
the United States government to indefinitely detain inadmissible
aliens.3 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit Court rejected the Sixth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals' decisions. The Borrero decision
1. 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003).
2. 8 U.S.C.A. § 123 1(a)(6) (West 1999).
3. Borrero, 325 F.3d at 1005. An inadmissible alien is one that is
determined ineligible to receive visas and is ineligible to be admitted into the
United States. See infra text accompanying notes 9-10.
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highlights .the dilemma facing thousands of inadmissible
aliens today-namely, indefinite detention inside U.S. prisons.
This Comment re-examines the Borrero decision concerning the
indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens. Part II details the
relevant law and facts framing the central issue in Borrero. Next,
Part III outlines the court's underlying reasoning in upholding the
constitutionality of the indefinite detention of Lazaro Borrero. Part
IV provides a detailed analysis of the Borrero court's flawed
reasoning. Part V looks beyond Borrero and addresses the
implications that flow from the Borrero court's decision. Lastly,
Part VI concludes that the Borrero court, by upholding the
government's right to detain inadmissible aliens indefinitely, reaches
the wrong conclusion
II. BACKGROUND
A nation's right to regulate its immigration policy has long been
recognized as inherent to the concept.of sovereignty.4 As such, it is
the United States' sovereign prerogative to govern aliens seeking
entry into its borders.5 Congress enacted 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6),
which arises from this inherent power. It reads:
An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 1182 of this title, removable under section
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who
has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to
the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and,
if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in
paragraph (3).6
4. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("This Court has long
held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the
power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative."). Sovereignty is
"freedom from external control." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1125 (10th ed. 1996).
5. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("[R]egulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.").
6. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6) (West 1999) (emphasis added).
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For purposes of § 1231(a)(6), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)7 states that an
inadmissible alien is one who is determined ineligible to receive
visas and is ineligible to be admitted into the United States.8 Section
1182 lists various categories of aliens who are inadmissible.
9
In recent years, § 1231 (a)(6) has been at the epicenter of several
constitutional challenges initiated by aliens facing indefinite
detention. With little guidance from § 1231's language, imprisoned
aliens, whose native countries have denied them repatriation, often
endure an uncertain fate inside U.S. prisons as detention "beyond the
removal period" becomes indefinite detention.
In the Supreme Court case Zadvydas v. Davis,10 the Court set
out to address the constitutionality of the indefinite detention of
aliens pursuant to § 1231(a)(6)." In Zadvydas, the class of aliens at
issue was removable aliens-aliens already admitted, but whom the
government sought to remove from the United States.' 2 Regarding
this class of aliens, the Court determined that although the statute's
express language does not demand it, removable aliens could only be
detained for a reasonable period-not indefinitely. 13 The Court's
decision, however, left unanswered the question of whether the
Zadvydas interpretation of § 1231(a)(6), implying a reasonable
detention period, also applied to inadmissible aliens. This question
went before the Eighth Circuit Court in Borrero v. Aljets in 2002.
A. Zadvydas v. Davis
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C.A. §
1231(a)(6), which grants the Attorney General the power to detain
removable aliens beyond the ninety-day statutory "removal period,"
did not authorize the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
to indefinitely detain removable aliens.14 Rather, the Court narrowed
7. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West 1999).
8. Id.
9. Id. Possible grounds for inadmissibility under § 1182 are: (1) carrying
communicable diseases or those suffering from physical or mental disorders;
(2) having multiple criminal convictions; (3) trafficking controlled substances;
(4) prostitution; and (5) security reasons. See id.
10. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
11. Id. at686.
12. Id. at 682.
13. Id. at 699.
14. See id.
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the statute's scope to avoid unconstitutionality by reading a six
month reasonableness limitation into the statute.15  The Court,
however, failed to address whether the six month reasonableness
period applied equally to the other categories of aliens listed in
§ 1231 (a)(6)-namely to inadmissible aliens.
B. Borrero v. Aljets
The pertinent facts in the Borrero case are undisputed. Lazaro
Borrero immigrated to the United States in the midst of the Mariel
boatlift in 1980.16 During this period, nearly 125,000 Cuban
refugees sought entry into the United States.1 7 Refusing to grant the
Mariel Cubans legal entry, the government instead offered the
refugees parole status.18 Parole under 8 U.S.C.A § 1182(d)(5)(A)
authorizes the Attorney General to physically admit aliens into the
country, yet simultaneously preserving the government's rights over
paroled aliens as non-entrants.1 9 The statute reads:
The Attorney General may... in his discretion parole into
the United States temporarily under such conditions as he
may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien
applying for admission to the United States, but such parole
of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the
alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien
shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue
to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.
20
In other words, due to their parole status, paroled aliens are treated as
though still awaiting entry at the border, despite being physically
present within the geographical United States.
2
15. See id. at 682, 701.
16. Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003).
17. Joshua W. Gardner, Halivay There: Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in
Indefinite Detentions, but Leaves Much Unanswered, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
177, 200 (2003).
18. Id.
19. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (West 1999).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. See Gardner, supra note 17, at 200.
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Borrero was officially paroled on June 4, 1980,22 and it was not
long thereafter that Borrero developed a criminal record. In 1983,
Borrero was convicted of battery. A year later, he was convicted of
cocaine possession, and in 1987, theft.23 In 1993, Borrero was again
arrested and convicted this time for the sale and possession of
cocaine, and for the possession of a handgun by a felon.24 While in
state custody serving time for his 1993 convictions, the INS
commenced removal proceedings against Borrero.25  The
immigration judge ruled Borrero removable and inadmissible due to
his extensive criminal record.26 On appeal the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's decision.27
In the fall of 2000, Borrero served his full prison sentence in
state custody and he was released into INS custody for further
detention.28  Subsequently, the INS revoked Borrero's parole,
referencing his lengthy criminal past as grounds for revocation, and
determined that paroling Borrero was not in the public interest. 29 To
complicate matters, Borrero's native country of Cuba refused the
U.S. permission to deport Borrero back to his country of origin.3 °
With no alternatives, Borrero appealed the INS's decision to the
United States District Court of Minnesota, alleging that because he
could not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, his
indefinite detention beyond the ninety-day INS removal period
violated his constitutional due process rights. 31 The district court
held in favor of Borrero.32 In its decision, the court extended the six-
month reasonableness period, set forth in Zadvydas, to apply equally
22. Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Many Mariel Cubans are considered criminals in the eyes of
the Cuban Government and are not granted re-entry. Louise Taylor,
Court: Criminal Immigrants Have Right to Due Process, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 6, 2003, available at http://www.kentucky.com/mld/
heraldleader/news/local/5327755.htm.
31. See Borrero, 325 F.3d at 1005.
32. Id.
Spring 2004] 1301
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to removable and inadmissible aliens.33 The district court argued
that without a significant probability that Borrero "'actually will be
removed from the United States in the reasonably foreseeable
future,"' the INS no longer has the statutory authority to hold the
alien in custody.34 As such, the district court granted Borrero's
petition for writ of habeas corpus, releasing him on parole pursuant
to the terms and conditions that the INS deemed appropriate.35 The
government appealed.
III. BORRERO DECISION ON APPEAL
The issue before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Borrero
was whether the Zadvydas interpretation of § 123 1(a)(6) applied to
inadmissible aliens. The court of appeals held that the Zadvydas
interpretation did not apply to inadmissible aliens.36 Its decision
rested on two major points. First, the court held that Zadvydas was
not controlling in Borrero because the Supreme Court remained
silent on the issue of indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens.37
Second, the court rejected Borrero's due process argument because
paroled aliens (for their failure to affect legal entry) are not
guaranteed the same due process rights that are extended to
admissible aliens.
38
A. Zadvydas Is Not Controlling In Borrero
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Zadvydas
decision was not controlling in Borrero because the Zadvydas court
squarely addressed only the constitutionality of the indefinite
detention of removable aliens. 39 Therefore, Zadvydas did not require
the Borrero court to extend the reasonableness limitation to
inadmissible aliens.4 °  The Borrero court stated that the
constitutional issue avoided in Zadvydas was whether the "post-
removal-period statute authorizes the Attorney General to detain a
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Borrero v. Aljets, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1044 (D. Minn.
2001)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1006-07.
38. See id. at 1007-08.
39. Id. at 1007.
40. See id. at 1006-07.
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removable alien indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a
period reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal."'41 The
court held that granting the Attorney General authority to indefinitely
detain removable aliens would raise "serious constitutional
problem[s]" under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.42
Therefore, a narrow interpretation was needed to maintain the
statute's constitutionality. Because the Zadvydas decision only
applied to aliens whose detention "raise[d] serious constitutional
doubt-admitted aliens,' '43 the presumptive six month reasonable
detention period set forth in Zadvydas did not apply to Borrero.
Ultimately, the Borrero court found Zadvydas silent on the issue of
inadmissible aliens.
B. The Court Rejects Borrero 's Due Process Claim
Next, the Eighth Circuit addressed Borrero's due process claims.
The Supreme Court decided long ago that the Due Process Clause
protects aliens from arbitrary punishment.44  Additionally, the
government may not deprive an alien of life, liberty or property
without due process of the law.45 Therefore, Borrero argued that
although the Zadvydas holding did not expressly refer to
inadmissible aliens, the Zadvydas reasoning that § 1231(a)(6)
contained an implicit six-month reasonable detention period, as
applied to removable aliens, should apply with equal force and
weight to inadmissible aliens.46
The Eighth Circuit, however, reasoned that Borrero's parole
status precluded his due process argument.47 The court concluded
that once an alien physically enters the country, the Due Process
Clause applies to him equally; 48 however, with respect to aliens who
have not effected entry, the government may apply a different
standard of due process, because "[w]hatever the procedure
41. Id. at 1006 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1007.
44. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
45. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
46. Brief of Appellee at 22, Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir.
2003) (No. 02-1506).
47. Borrrero, 325 F.3d at 1008.
48. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953).
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authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned." 49
The court focused on the fact that Borrero had yet to effect entry
into the United States, and that his failure to do so presented an
entirely different question.50 The Borrero court instead cited to
Mezei as controlling. In Mezei, the Supreme Court rejected an
alien's due process challenge to indefinite detention on the grounds
that he had not effected entry into the United States.
5 1
Mezei involved an alien who, after living in the United States for
twenty-five years, traveled abroad for nineteen months.52  Upon
returning to the United States, the government stopped Mezei at Ellis
Island and, without a hearing, permanently excluded him from the
United States.5 3 With no nation willing to take Mezei in, he faced
indefinite detention on Ellis Island.5"
The Borrero court stressed that the "critical difference [between
Zadvydas and Mezei] was that Mezei had not effected an entry into
the United States. Although Mezei was physically present on Ellis
Island, 'he was "treated," for constitutional purposes, "as if stopped
at the border." And that made all the difference."' 55 Consequently,
Mezei could be detained under a lower standard of due process than
aliens who had effected entry.
Therefore, much like an alien stopped at Ellis Island, an alien
paroled into the United States is not entitled to the same
constitutional protections afforded to admitted aliens. In effect, the
court extended Mezei to cover aliens physically present in the United
States who had yet to effect "legal" entry. Despite Borrero's
physical presence in the United States, the court held that "[p]arole
does not constitute an entry.",56 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the
49. Id.
50. See Borrero, 325 F.3d at 1007-08.
51. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In
fact, Mezei was an immigrant who was detained at Ellis Island. The Court
held this to be the equivalent of being stopped at the border. Id. at 215.
52. Id. at 208-09.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 208-09.
55. Borrero, 325 F.3d at 1007-08 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 693 (2001)).
56. Id. at 1008.
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indefinite detention of Borrero, in light of Zadvydas and Mezei, did
not violate his due process rights.57
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Borrero from
other cases in which the government granted inadmissible aliens full
due process rights.58 Those cases concerned due process pertaining
to criminal proceedings and did not address the issue of due process
concerning aliens stopped at the border.59 As a result, the Borrero
court held that § 1231(a)(6), as applied to paroled aliens, fell within
the "sovereign prerogative of the executive branch to set immigration
policy and [the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens did] not
violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 6°
Consequently, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded the Borrero case to the district court with
directions to dismiss Borrero's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
61
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT'S REASONING IN BORRERO IS FLAWED
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' conclusion seems
questionable, and its reasoning is unpersuasive. In holding that §
1231(a)(6) contained an implicit distinction between inadmissible
and removable aliens, the Borrero court (1) ignored § 1231's clear
language; (2) the Zadvydas decision, upon which the court heavily
relied, does not support a dual interpretation of § 1231; (3) limited
the constitutional protections extended to inadmissible aliens,
thereby depriving inadmissible aliens of their due process rights; and
(4) erred in failing to consider the United States' binding
international treaty obligations and customary international law in its
interpretation of § 1231 (a)(6).
A. The Court Ignored Statutory Language
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ignores the fact that neither
the statute's language nor the Zadvydas opinion warrants
57. Id.
58. See id. (citing Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001);
Hoyte-Mesa v. Ashcroft, 272 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2001); Barrera-
Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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distinguishing between inadmissible and removable aliens
concerning indefinite detention.
62
The clear language of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (a)(6) demonstrates that
the statute draws no distinction between removable and inadmissible
aliens.63 In Zadvydas, Justice Kennedy took notice of this fact in his
dissent. 64 He noted that the statute's text "provides for detention of
both categories within the same statutory grant of authority," and "it
is not a plausible construction of § 1231 (a)(6) to imply a time limit
as to one class but not to another. The text does not admit of this
possibility., 65 Rather, the more plausible construction is that the
statute only authorizes the Attorney General to detain the three
categories of aliens (inadmissible, removable, and those aliens
presenting a risk to the public) beyond the removal period.
Justice Scalia also had difficulty understanding how § 1231's
language implies a distinction between inadmissible and removable
aliens. He stated, "[w]e are offered no justification why an alien
under a valid and final order of removal-which has totally
extinguished whatever right to presence in this country he
possessed-has any greater due process right to be released into the
country than an alien at the border seeking entry."66 Furthermore,
Scalia added, "both groups of aliens-inadmissible aliens at the
threshold and criminal aliens under final order of removal
[removable aliens]-could be constitutionally detained on the same
terms, since it provided the authority to detain both groups in the
very same statutory provision., 67 Consequently, the statute's express
language provides little justification for the Eighth Circuit's decision
to distinguish between admissible and inadmissible aliens.
62. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6) (West 1999); see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001).
63. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6) reads: An alien ordered removed who is
inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely
to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph
(3). 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6).
64. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1306
INADMISSIBLE ALIENS
B. The Zadvydas Decision Does Not Support an Implied Distinction
Between Inadmissible and Admissible Aliens as to the Application of
§ 1231(a)(6)
The Zadvydas holding provides little justification for
distinguishing between inadmissible and admissible aliens. The
Zadvydas Court's holding is clear, stating "we construe the statute to
contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of
which is subject to federal-court review." 68 Moreover, the Court was
clear as to whom the statute applied-"aliens who have been ordered
removed, namely inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who
have violated their nonimmigrant status conditions., 69 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court referred to aliens generally, stating, "[i]n our
view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits
an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United
States. 7°
The Zadvydas Court's use of broad language describing the
statute's application to a general class of aliens is illuminating. Had
the Supreme Court desired to clarify that there was a distinction
between removable and inadmissible aliens, it could easily have
qualified its holding to apply solely to admissible aliens. Based on
the Supreme Court's holding in Zadvydas, the Borrero court's
decision denying inadmissible aliens the same reasonable detention
period granted to removable aliens conflicts with the Court's broad
and general language. This suggests a uniform interpretation of §
1231 (a)(6) as applied to both admissible and inadmissible aliens.
Two circuit courts agree that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(a)(6) applies
equally to inadmissible aliens and removable aliens. In Rosales-
Garcia v. Holland,71 based upon a review of the plain language of
the statute, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found it difficult to
understand how the Zadvydas Court could interpret the statute to
contain a reasonable detention period for removable aliens, but not
for inadmissible aliens.72 The court recognized that interpreting the
statute to have different meanings for inadmissible and admissible
68. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
71. 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 404.
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aliens "'would render the meaning of any statute as changeable as
the currents of the sea, and potentially as cruel and capricious."'
73
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Xi v. INS74 held
that in light of Zadvydas, § 1231(a)(6) "bears the same meaning for
an individual deemed inadmissible" and removable.75 The Ninth
Circuit further acknowledged the principle that when the court
narrowly interprets a statute to avoid unconstitutionality, the
interpretation should apply "categorically to all future cases whether
or not the circumstances raise the same constitutional questions. 76
Therefore, based on the statute's clear language and the Zadvydas
Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Zadvydas
interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) applied with equal force to
inadmissible and removable aliens.
77
C. Due Process Should Be Afforded to Inadmissible Aliens
By substantially limiting the due process rights granted to
paroled aliens, the Borrero court wrongly ignored the purpose
underlying the parole fiction. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments is "universal in [its] application,
[applying] to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. 78 Also,
"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent." 79  There is no doubt that
Borrero is a person in every sense of the word and a person within
the United States deserving of the constitutional protections afforded
by the Due Process Clause.
73. Id. at 406 (quoting Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210, 215 (3rd. Cir.
2001)).
74. 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002).
75. Id. at 834.
76. Borrero v. Aijets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003).
77. Xi, 298 F.3d at 836.
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (emphasis added).
79. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 210 (1982)).
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1. The Parole fiction is not intended to strip
aliens of their due process rights
The Borrero court relied on the parole fiction to limit Borrero's
due process rights. Although parole is the legal equivalent of being
stopped at the border, the parole fiction is often considered an
"administrative compromise," 80 and "parole... is simply a device
through which needless confinement is avoided while administrative
proceedings are conducted., 81 Further, the parole fiction was not
intended to deprive aliens living in the United States of due
process.82 In Rosales-Garcia, the Sixth Circuit held that the INS
could not indefinitely detain paroled Cuban aliens whose removal
was not significantly likely within the foreseeable future.83 The
Rosales-Garcia court acknowledged the "parole fiction" in its
decision, but that factor was not dispositive. The court stated that
"[w]hile we respect the historical tradition of the 'entry fiction,' we
do not believe it applies to deprive aliens living in the United States
of their status as 'persons' for the purposes of constitutional due
process ' 84 because "once an alien gains admission to our country and
begins to develop ties that go with permanent residence his
constitutional status changes accordingly. 85
Also, in Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court held with respect
to paroled Cuban aliens that "[e]ven one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that
constitutional protection [of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments]. 86 Therefore, the parole fiction should not
be employed to strip or severely limit Borrero's due process rights.
2. Reliance on Mezei is misplaced
The court of appeals erred by relying too heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Mezei. Mezei is not dispositive and is
distinguishable from Borrero. In Mezei the Court sustained the
80. Note, Indefinite Detention of Immigrant Parolees: An Unconstitutional
Condition?, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1868, 1872 (2003).
81. Leng May Mav. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
82. See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003).
83. Id. at 390.
84. Id. at 409.
85. Id. (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)).
86. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
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government's right to indefinitely detain Mezei without violating his
due process rights because he had failed to effect entry.87 The Mezei
Court, however, "grounded its decision in the special circumstances
of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney
General that Mezei presented a threat to national security,, 8 8 citing
the Passport Act of 1918 as the Attorney General's grant of power to
indefinitely detain Mezei.89 In Borrero, although he was a convicted
criminal, a crucial distinguishing factor was that Borrero was never
determined to be a threat to national security and no similar
justification existed for his indefinite detention as in Mezei.
Therefore, Mezei should not be dispositive in Borrero.
D. The Borrero Court Ignores Prevailing International Law
Principles and Customary Standards
The last deficiency in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
analysis lies in its complete failure to consider binding United States
treaty obligations and customary international legal standards.
Article IX of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ratified by the United States in 199290 states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention."9' The United Nations
finds detention arbitrary when a detainee is detained beyond the
completion of his sentence.92 By adopting Borrero, the courts
discount the weight and relevance of a binding international treaty.
If Congress intended to directly contravene a binding treaty
obligation by authorizing indefinite detention, it could have done so
through proper legislation specifically overriding the binding
treaty.93 When a statute conflicts with international law, the courts
87. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
88. Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 413-14.
89. Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1010 (8th Cir. 2003).
90. 138 CONG. REc. S4781-84 (Apr. 2, 1992).
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976).
92. Gardner, supra note 17, at 205.
93. Id. at 204.
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must construe it in a manner that does not directly violate a valid
treaty obligation.94
Similarly, the Borrero court failed to consider customary
international law, which strongly condemns arbitrary and indefinite
detention.95 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.,
96
Also, the American Convention on Human Rights reads, "[e]very
person has the right to personal liberty and security... No one shall
be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment., 97 Additionally, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that a state
violates international law if it "practices, encourages, or
condones.., prolonged arbitrary detention.' 98 The United States'
practice of detaining aliens indefinitely beyond the standard removal
period is cruel and arbitrary to say the least, and when interpreting
the statute, the courts should not ignore the international
denunciation of arbitrary and indefinite detention.
Considering existing treaty obligations and customary
international law would allow the courts to interpret Congress's
intent more faithfully. If "Congress [had] intended to give the
Attorney General the power to act in a way so contradictory to
international law, one would have expected Congress to have done
so more explicitly."99 In light of the sentiment against indefinite
detention, the Borrero court erred in failing to consider binding
treaty obligations and international law.
Although this Comment illustrates the Borrero decision's
glaring shortcomings, it does not necessarily follow that the
alternative is the unconditional release of inadmissible aliens
convicted of crimes into the public. To the contrary, once the six-
month reasonable detention period is exhausted and repatriation is no
94. Id. at 203-04. This doctrine is known as the Charming Betsy principle,
which calls for courts to interpret statutes so they are consistent with
international law. Id. at 204.
95. Id. at 204-05.
96. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71(1948).
97. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica", opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 7, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147
(entered into force July 18, 1978).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987).
99. Gardner, supra note 17, at 206.
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longer a viable option, the inadmissible alien should be released
subject to the conditions set forth by the Attorney General. Justice
Heaney, in his dissent in Borrero, echoed this sentiment, stating that
"'a writ of habeas corpus will not make Petitioner a truly free
man .... The INS can still impose terms and conditions of release
upon him and can still take him back into custody if he violates those
terms and conditions,"' and that the "'[p]etitioner is still subject to
removal from the United States whenever the government can find
some place to send him."' 00 This policy is more reasonable than
indefinite detention, because it serves justice, while preserving the
alien's rights and individual dignity.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING A "BoRRERo" POLICY
Adopting the Borrero interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) and
allowing the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens who have no
hope of removal has significant implications. Doing so severely
limits the constitutional rights of thousands of aliens; incentivizes
aliens to disobey immigration laws; unduly strains limited
government resources; and reflects negatively on the image of the
United States within the international community.
A. Borrero Extends the Government Limitless Power to Deprive
Inadmissible Aliens of Due Process
One implication flowing from Borrero is that it leaves
inadmissible aliens vulnerable to the whims of the government. If
the government has the right to proscribe whatever due process
measures it deems appropriate concerning inadmissible aliens, this
raises the question-what are the limits of this power?
The Borrero decision leaves open the possibility for the
government to deprive an inadmissible alien of due process rights
entirely. In Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, Justice Moore expressed this
concern in a more extreme fashion, stating that "[i]f excludable
aliens were not protected by even the substantive component of
constitutional due process, as the government appears to argue, we
do not see why the United States government could not torture or
100. Borrero v. Aijets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1010 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Borrero v. Aljets, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1044 (D. Minn.
2001)).
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summarily execute them."'10' The narrow interpretation of Borrero
leaves paroled aliens with few constitutional protections. The few
remaining safeguards they have remain subject to the capriciousness
of the political process.
B. Borrero Deters Aliens From Complying With United States
Immigration Laws
Another consequence of severely limiting an aliens' due process
rights under the guise of the parole fiction is that it discourages them
from obeying current immigration laws. 10 2  A "Borrero" policy
leaves an alien with little incentive to respect our immigration laws
and processes. 103 As opposed to illegal immigrants, "many parolees
have shown respect for our admissions system and the rule of U.S.
law."'1 4 An alien is constitutionally no better off seeking parole
status and complying with our immigration laws under Borrero than
if the alien ignored our immigration laws entirely and entered the
country illegally. Consequently, a "Borrero" policy may deter an
alien, who would otherwise follow proper immigration regulations,
from complying with immigration procedures.
C. The Indefinite Detention of Inadmissible Aliens Wastes
Government Resources
In addition to severely limiting an alien's constitutional rights
and deterring aliens from respecting United States immigration laws,
the practice of indefinitely detaining inadmissible aliens, validated
by Borrero, wastes valuable government resources. As of 2001, the
United States had in its custody approximately 1,750 Marielitos like
Borrero serving time in its prisons; "not serving time for crimes, but
in jailhouse limbo because Cuba refuses to take them back."'
0 5
These prisoners require food, clothing, medical care, and housing
while incarcerated. Furthermore, these detained aliens occupy space
within an already crowded prison system. Society will have to
101. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386,410 (6th Cir. 2003).
102. See Gardner, supra note 17, at 201.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Louise Taylor, Court: Criminal Immigrants Have Right to Due Process,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 6, 2003, available at http://www.
kentucky.con/mld/heraldleader/news/local/5327755 .htm.
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provide additional prison facilities in order to accommodate the
increased demand for space. In addition, indefinite detention
interferes with an alien's ability to work and economically support
his or her dependants. 10 6 This leads to additional costs incurred by
the government, which will most likely have the burden of
supporting the families. 1
07
D. Borrero Tarnishes the Image of the United States Within the
International Community
Lastly, the Borrero decision reflects negatively on the United
States in the international community. The decision of theUnited
States to accept the Borrero court's holding allowing for the
indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens, runs counter to a
multitude of international legal standards denouncing arbitrary and
indefinite detention of prisoners. 0 8 As one of the world's staunchest
advocates of human rights, the United States loses legitimacy in light
of such hypocrisy. Adopting a "Borrero" policy might undermine
foreign relations with those nations that disagree with the proposition
advanced in Borrero.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unless the courts extend § 1231's six-month reasonable
detention period as set forth in Zadvydas with respect to removable
aliens, inadmissible aliens imprisoned in the United States will be
subject to indefinite detention regardless of whether their debt to
society has been paid.
Borrero will not be the last United States judicial decision
regarding the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens. As it
stands, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in Borrero is
contrary to the Sixth and Ninth Circuit decisions. 10 9
The Eighth Circuit decision in Borrero incorrectly interpreted §
1231 to contain an implicit distinction between inadmissible and
removable aliens. The plain text of the statute, however, leaves no
106. ACLU, Analysis of Immigration Detention Policies, (Aug. 18, 1999),
at http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.c fm?ID=5075&c=
95.
107. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
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room for such an interpretation. Moreover, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 1231 (a)(6) in Zadvydas, on which the Borrero
court relied, does distinguish between removable and inadmissible
aliens with respect to the reasonableness limitation. Also, the
Borrero decision significantly limits constitutional protections
afforded to inadmissible aliens. Lastly, the Borrero Court erred in
interpreting § 1231(a)(6) in a manner that conflicts with binding
United States treaty obligations and existing international legal
standards.
These oversights will have long term repercussions. The
decision leaves inadmissible aliens vulnerable to the whims of the
political process; deters future aliens from complying with U.S.
immigration laws; puts undue strain on government resources; and
reflects negatively on the United States among the international
community.
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